Erizeli Jely Bandaro delivered a pointed critique of what he calls a new form of “reciprocal politics.” 

On his Facebook page, commentator Erizeli Jely Bandaro delivered a pointed critique of what he calls a new form of “reciprocal politics.” According to him, the government no longer needs to weaken the moral authority of major Islamic organizations through pressure, labeling, or restrictive regulations. Those methods belong to the past. Today, a subtler and far more effective approach is used: resource patronage.

The offer comes in a short, disarming sentence: “Here, take a mining concession.”
What follows, Erizeli argues, is a quiet collapse of moral legitimacy.

Not through force. Not through censorship. Through temptation.

From Moral Pulpits to Coal Pits

For decades, large Islamic organizations served as moral anchors in society. They shaped public discourse, influenced elections, and acted as a counterweight to the country’s oligarchic machinery. Their legitimacy came from their perceived integrity and their commitment to public welfare.

KWI and PGI stand out for refusing mining patronage and preserving their moral authority.

According to Erizeli, this changed the moment mining permits began to flow toward their leadership. Once these organizations entered the world of extractive business, their public mission shifted. The vocabulary of moral guidance slowly gave way to the language of investment. Feasibility studies replaced sermons. Cash flow projections overshadowed social advocacy.

As a result, the public no longer viewed them as guardians of moral order. They became new players in Indonesia’s long-standing competition for mining concessions. Moral authority eroded silently from within.

A Political Strategy Executed With Surgical Precision

Erizeli argues that the brilliance of this strategy lies in its simplicity. The government does not have to challenge these organizations. It does not need to divide their leaders. It only needs to nudge them into an arena that consumes their attention.

When the leadership becomes preoccupied with land size, investor negotiations, royalty calculations, and production targets, they have little time left to shape electoral politics or push for social justice. Their internal energy is redirected. Their public influence diminishes. Their moral voice weakens.

This is not repression. It is co-optation through distraction.

Patronage That Collapses From Within

The internal dynamics that follow are predictable. Conflicts emerge over shares. Committees split between those who discuss environmental ethics and those who pursue investment planning. Meetings become dominated by questions of capital expenditure and tonnage levels.

According to Erizeli, this is the most effective form of political containment. No direct confrontation is needed. The organization slowly loses its electoral weight because its own internal motivations have shifted.

The strategy is clinical. It is quiet. It is devastating.

And the Public Watches the Irony Unfold

Citizens see the irony clearly. Groups that once challenged the government now wait for signatures on concession permits. Organizations that once spoke of moral responsibility now promote mining-related corporate social responsibility programs.

People realize the state does not need open conflict to neutralize its greatest political patrons. It only needs to offer something they find too valuable to refuse. Mining becomes a political instrument as effective as any regulation.

A Stark Contrast: How KWI and PGI Avoided the Trap

In this landscape, the stance of the Indonesian Bishops’ Conference and the Communion of Churches in Indonesia stands out. Both KWI and PGI deliberately avoided the mining patronage trap. They did not enter the arena of permits, royalties, or extractive partnerships.

By refusing to treat resource concessions as an extension of their institutional power, they preserved their moral authority. Their statements continue to focus on human dignity, justice, peace, and the common good. They remain socially prophetic because they are not entangled in resource politics.

Their decision not to step into the orbit of extractive wealth allowed them to retain a consistent moral voice. In a time when many institutions risk diluting their identity, KWI and PGI chose clarity.

The Future of Moral Authority in the Age of Concessions

Erizeli’s criticism describes a quiet transformation of Indonesia’s political landscape. Moral authority weakens not because the state attacks it, but because it is gently absorbed into economic incentives. When organizations trade moral clarity for mineral access, their public credibility dims.

At the same time, KWI and PGI demonstrate that institutions can avoid this downward spiral. By remaining grounded in their humanitarian and prophetic missions, they show that moral authority can still be preserved.

In the era of resource politics, integrity becomes the rarest and most valuable currency.